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The relationship between state behavior and system behavior has occupied 
the attention of scholars and practitioners of international politics for 
hundreds of years. The predominant assumption of state behavior is that 
states act in their self-interest; his is their best guarantee of survival in an 
anarchic world. But most observers feel that system equilibrium is not 
possible in a world of such states; some additional element is necessary to 
preserve the main characteristics of the system. In this paper, a computer 
simulation is used to investigate (a) whether in a world of self-interested 
states, system-level behavior that acts to preserve or restore equilibrium will 
emerge, and (b) whether this is sufficient to preserve most of the actors in 
the system. 
Introduction 
For hundreds of years scholars and practitioners of international politics have 
studied and written about the interrelationship between the actions of individual 
states and the behavior of the interstate system. Two questions have been of 
particular concern: (1) how do states interact to create or modify the system? and (2) 
how does the system constrain the actions of individual states? In this paper I will use 
a computer simulation to explore whether in a particular anarchic system, the 
interaction of self-interested states can lead to emergent properties above the state 
level, and whether in turn, these properties can serve to preserve the essential 
characteristics of the state system. 
Preserving the State and Preserving the System in an Anarchic World 
In the writings of many, the interstate system is viewed as an anarchy. There are few 
rules of conduct between states, and no supranational actor to enforce any code of 
behavior. As a result, international politics is a "struggle for power." 
Author's note: My thanks to the editors and reviewers at ISQ for their suggestions and their patience. This paper is 
much improved owing to their efforts. Of course, any errors are mine and mine alone. 
0020-8833/87/04 0387-16 $03.00 ? 1987 International Studies Association 
This content downloaded from 128.42.230.100 on Thu, 2 May 2013 15:01:48 PM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
388 System and State in International Politics 
Preserving the State 
One popular theme in the international politics literature is the implication of an 
anarchic world for individual states. They must use every means at their disposal to 
protect, preserve, and expand their interests. Of course, states must not behave 
recklessly; expansion in the face of more powerful adversaries can result in defeat, 
with its attendant loss of power. It may even result in the elimination of the state. The 
notion that a successful state is one that prudently exercises power to advance its 
interests is widely held by such diverse authors as the "policy advisors" Kautilya and 
Machiavelli (Modelski, 1964; Machiavelli, 1940), the realist school that developed in 
the early post-World War II era (Morganthau, revised by Thompson, 1985), and 
scholars who combine formal deductive models with statistical tests (Bueno de 
Mesquita, 1981). 
This list is by no means a complete one, but demonstrates that a wide variety of 
authors have worked within this framework. All assume that "reason of state" is the 
only justification necessary for a government to undertake actions, no matter what 
the consequences for other states. All authors share an interest in predicting and 
understanding the maneuvers of individual states in an anarchic environment. 
Preserving the System 
Another popular theme in international politics discussed by many authors (includ- 
ing some of those just mentioned) is the behavior of the system. Interest in this topic 
springs from many sources, but surely one is the apparently paradoxical observation 
that while individual states are assumed to pursue their interests, even if this means 
destroying other states, there are large blocks of time during which all the prominent 
states in a system survive relatively intact. How does a system whose members are 
individually committed to expansion maintain itself in equilibrium? This is a key 
question in the vast and tangled literature on the "balance of power" (see Haas, 1953; 
and Claude, 1962, for surveys of the multiple meanings that have been attached to 
this phrase). 
The literature suggests a number of different answers to that question. One is that 
in a balance-of-power system, there are certain rules of behavior that among other 
things proscribe the elimination of at least the prominent states. States are free to 
pursue their interests, even if this requires the waging of war, but they cannot take 
the final step of destroying an opponent-at least not an essential one (Kaplan, 1957: 
22-36). 
A second answer to the question is the existence within the system of a small 
number of states (usually one) that maintain a strong interest in the equilibrium of 
the system, and act to preserve it. Such states are called balancers; Great Britain is 
often asserted to have played this role for many years in the European state system 
(Crowe, 1929; reprinted in Pfaltzgraff, 1971). 
A third answer to how the system is preserved assumes that in a balance-of-power 
system, power is distributed fairly evenly across the major states of the system, and 
that these states have a large number of short-term ties to other members of the 
system. This combinat:on makes it almost impossible for a state to estimate accurately 
the consequences of any aggressive actions (Deutsch and Singer, 1964; Singer, 
Bremer, and Stuckey, 1972). Prudence therefore dictates that a state should refrain 
from engaging in expansionist activity because of the possible losses that may result. 
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The "Invisible Hand" and the Preservation of the System 
Although each of these answers is very different, they all do share a common 
element. Each assumes that something beyond the self-interest of states is necessary 
to maintain or restore system equilibrium. This additional element can take the form 
of a unique kind of state (a balancer); it can involve a feature of the international 
regime (rules prohibiting the destruction of states); or it might be found in a 
particular start-up condition (the even distribution of power); but the presumption is 
that if this element should disappear, the system is likely to undergo some 
fundamental transformation. 
Not everyone agrees that some special stabilizing element is necessary to preserve 
or restore equilibrium. In his typology of balance-of-power systems (a system defined 
as a certain kind of arrangement for the operation of international relations in a 
world of many states), Claude (1962: 20-25) discusses an automatic balance-of- 
power system. In such a system, the cumulative effect of all states pursuing their 
self-interest is the preservation of equilibrium. The principle is analogous to that of 
the "invisible hand" in economics; all buyers and sellers are assumed to maximize 
their self-interest, but the result at the system level is that without conscious 
motivation or even awareness on the part of any individual actor, equilibrium of 
supply and demand is maintained. 
The most forceful contemporary advocate of the ability of an automatic balance- 
of-power system to stabilize itself is Waltz (1975, 1979). To him, "[b]alance of power 
theory is a theory about the results produced by the uncoordinated action of 
individual states. It is not a theory of state policy, but rather a theory about 
environmental constraints. The environment is produced by the actions and the 
interactions of states, but that environment then appears, like a market in a 
competitive conomy, as a force that no state acting alone can control (Waltz, 1975: 
41)." 
Despite Waltz's assertive statement, he is very much in the minority. The opinion 
of the majority is certainly that we should not expect states to rise above self-interest 
in their individual actions; indeed, a state that fails to recognize and act on this basis 
courts disaster. But while assuming that self-interest is the only reliable guide to state 
survival, the majority views it as an insufficient guarantee of system stability. 
But there are several reasons we should not be so quick to pass off the impact of 
the interaction of a group of self-interested states. First, in a system in which most 
states pursue their own self-interest, he resulting interaction may be so powerful as 
to overwhelm the various mechanisms that are counted on to maintain equilibrium. 
Certainly, in the economic sphere any number of examples, from the existence of 
black markets in Communist countries to the troubles of the Organization of 
Petroleum Exporting Countries in times of lowered demand for oil, demonstrate 
that individual self-interest is a powerful force that can be only partly restrained by 
nonmarket means. 
Second, the interaction of self-interested actors may have positive effects, as 
demonstrated in the recent work of Axelrod (1984). He shows that in a wide variety 
of settings cooperation can emerge and persist in social systems that consist entirely 
of egoists (actors motivated by self-interest), without any central authority. Axelrod's 
research does not show that self-interest always leads to a cooperative outcome, but 
he does demonstrate that this outcome can occur in a variety of unlikely circum- 
stances. 
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Consequently, we have reason to suspect that self-interest produces powerful 
effects, and ones that are not necessarily negative for the equilibrium of the system. 
These suspicions deserve closer investigation in the arena of international relations 
theory, and lie at the heart of this paper. More specifically I will explore whether in a 
primitive, anarchic system in which all states base their decisions on a simple 
calculation of power gain and loss, (a) does system-preserving (i.e., balancing) 
behavior emerge? and (b) is this sufficient to preserve the existence of a multistate 
system? 
My exploration is conducted by analyzing data generated by a Monte Carlo 
computer simulation. The program is a reconstruction of a simulation developed a 
decade ago (Bremer and Mihalka, 1977), which unfortunately no longer exists in its 
original form. Before I describe the program and the research design used to 
investigate the questions posed above, a short discussion on the value of computer 
simulation for this investigation is in order. 
The Merits of This Exercise 
Scholars of power politics and the balance of power have used a wide variety of 
methods in their research. Each has its own strengths and weaknesses, and all have 
yielded interesting conjectures and insights on the subject. My purpose here is not to 
review the techniques of others, but to argue that computer simulation can be a 
useful tool in exploring questions relating to power politics and the balance of power. 
First let me be clear about the purpose of this paper. It is to conduct a "theoretical 
experiment." That is, I wish to explore certain long-run consequences of a set of 
assumptions about state behavior. For the present, I am not interested in whether the 
assumptions or their possible consequences mirror the actual behavior of states. In 
the long run, of course, it is the actual behavior of states and systems that is to be 
explained. But given the divergence in the theoretical literature as to the nature and 
existence of system equilibrium in an anarchic system, additional study at this level is 
merited. 
Justifying this type of study is a two-part process. First, the case must be made for 
the value of abstract models as an aid to theory development. Second, the advantages 
of computer simulation in building and examining these models must be shown. 
The Value of Abstraction 
In a recent book, Gilpin (1981: xiii) discusses what he calls the basic dilemma of social 
science: to "explain trivial matters with exactitude, or to treat significant matters with 
imprecision." Despite the hyperbole, there is a certain amount of truth in his 
statement; and clearly, this paper falls into the latter of Gilpin's two categories. What 
is the value of such studies? 
Their primary strength is the abstraction that Gilpin notes in his statement. A 
model that is free of elements peculiar to any specific empirical context is potentially 
applicable to a variety of these contexts. If our goal is to develop models that can 
account for the widest possible set of situations, we must formulate these models on a 
very high level-of generality. 
There is an important side benefit to the construction of a model designed to be 
invariant over a significant span of time and space. Since concepts applicable to a 
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single era or geographic area cannot be used, the net result is often a simpler model 
than one that is tailored to fit closely a single domain. 
A simple model can also be a "pure" or "ideal" case. Such a model can better 
illustrate the impact of individual assumptions, as well as the total consequences of 
the entire set. The more realistic a model, the more complicated it is, and the harder 
it is to make these determinations. The simpler the model, the better we can 
understand it and use its insights to account for behavior. 
But we purchase the ability to talk about a wide set of cases at the cost of being 
unable to say as much as we would like about individual cases. This is a large price to 
pay unless we have some reason to believe that a single model (albeit a very general 
one) can offer a high level of insight into many different circumstances. Without this 
assurance, we run the danger of becoming involved in a totally artificial exercise that 
does not lead to knowledge about international politics. 
Fortunately, there is a degree of uniformity in descriptions of state (or city-state) 
systems, not only in Europe, but in ancient India (Modelski, 1964), Renaissance Italy, 
the Chou dynasty in China (Holsti, 1977), and even as a possible cause of the Trojan 
War (Wood, 1985). All these accounts speak of a system with few rules of conduct, 
forcing states to rely on their own resources and abilities particularly their 
power-to survive and prosper. 
The Value of Simulation 
Computer simulation allows a researcher to present a model as a series of program 
statements. This facility permits the researcher to "create" a world that corresponds 
exactly to her/his model. This flexibility can greatly reduce the difference between 
one's informal expression of a model and the language used to make it more 
rigorous and susceptible to evaluation and testing. 
A second advantage of this approach is that the computer can serve as a 
"deduction machine" to display the consequences of the interaction of a set of 
assumptions after any finite length of simulated time; that is, a simulation is a 
working model. In an investigation such as this, the main interest is in the emergent 
properties of a system, and the long-run consequence of these properties for state 
behavior. This may be very hard to determine using another research approach. 
A third advantage of computer simulation is that the researcher is guaranteed that 
she or he is viewing a closed system. No unprogrammed external factors can 
intervene to affect the evolution of the system. Whatever the long-run outcome, a 
researcher can be sure that this was due to some combination of the program and its 
inputs (of course, determining the exact specification of the causal process may not 
be trivial or straightforward). A glance back through history shows that in several 
cases (the Italian city-states during the Renaissance, for example), the "natural" 
development of the system was disrupted by the entrance of an external power 
(France). A simulation can allow us to follow the course of "natural evolution" to its 
logical outcome, which may not be possible with empirical methods. 
Finally, judicious use of random elements (i.e., a Monte Carlo simulation) can aid 
in an investigation. They can be used to introduce necessary but theoretically 
uninteresting processes in the model, or to help approximate important factors for 
which an explicit specification is unavailable or impractical. However, a price is paid 
for the introduction of these elements. First, the simulation must be run a number of 
times, since any single run may be the result of extreme or atypical values. Second, as 
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a consequence of the necessity for multiple runs, conclusions can be formed only in 
terms of the general, typical, or average behavior of the system. It is not possible to 
find a deterministic solution. 
Given these characteristics, a Monte Carlo computer simulation is an appropriate 
tool for exploring the long-term consequences of an anarchic international system. It 
offers a set of strengths that are particularly apt for a theoretical experiment on the 
interaction between state and system. In the next section, I offer a brief description 
of the simulation, along with a discussion of the parameters and research design to 
be used in the exploration. 
Simulation, Parameters, and Research Design 
In this section I provide information on the simulation and specify how the 
theoretical experiment will be conducted. In brief, a set of parameters will be varied, 
and multiple runs (using different random number seeds) made on each combina- 
tion of parameters. The output from these runs will then be subjected to statistical 
analysis to shed light on the research questions. 
The Simulation 
In the interest of conserving space, only a brief description of the simulation is 
included, primarily in the form of an outline. Since no copy of the original version 
exists, I relied heavily on the extensive discussion in Bremer and Mihalka (1977) in 
my reconstruction. The reader is urged to consult the original source for a more 
in-depth discussion.' 
The simulation is most easily understood as consisting of four segments: an 
initialization segment that occurs only at the beginning of a run, and a sequence of 
three segments (opponent selection, war outcome and costs, power adjustment) that 
can occur in each iteration of the simulation. 
I. Initialization segment. 
A. Read in parameters for: 
1. Mean and standard deviation of power distribution. 
2. Standard deviation of power estimation distribution. 
3. Standard deviation of war outcome. 
4. Seed for random number generator. 
5. Maximum number of iterations. 
6. Internal growth rate. 
B. Set up initial "world." 
1. Initialize map to ninety-eight states in seven rows and fourteen columns 
(see figure 1). 
' I wish to acknowledge the work of Peter Holck, who initiated the coding of the reconstruction. The program is 
written in the C programming language, and consists of approximately 2,500 statements. It runs on an IBM-PC, 
and uses about 52K of memory. The program runs with or without an 8087 mathematical coprocessor chip. All 
runs for this paper were made using a coprocessor. Individual runs took four to five minutes; execution time is 
about four times longer in an IBM-PC without the chip. A copy of the code has been deposited in the editorial 
offices of International Studies Quarterly. ISQ will make copies available to other researchers, at the cost of 
reproduction, upon request. Another reconstruction of the original simulation has been undertaken by Cusack and 
Zimmer (1986). 
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Column 
Row 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 
1 /1\ /1T5\ /29\ /43\ /57\ /71\ /85\ 
/\ 8/8\ / T2\ /3_6\ /590\ /694\ /78\ /92\ 
2 /2\ _ /f6\ _ /30\ _ /44\ /58\ /72\ /86\ / 
\ _/9\ _/2f3\ _/7_ 5\_6\_/9\_/-93\ 
3 / 3\ /Y-7\ /_ /1\ 4\_ 5\_/3\ _ /87\ _/ 
\ _/1-0\ _/2f4\ /_ 8\ _/592\ _/696\ _/890\ /_ 4\ 
4 / 4\ _/Y-8\ _ /32\ _ /46\ _/690\ _/7-4\ _/898\_/ 
\ _ /111\ _/2f5\ _ /39\ _/593\ _/697\ _/891\ _/-95\ 
5 /5\ _/Y-9\ _ /33\ _ /47\ _/611\ _/7-5\ _/899\_/ 
\_/1-2\ _/2f6\ _ /40\ /594\ _/698\ _/892\ /-96\ 
6 /6 6\ /_O/2\ _ /34\ _ /48\ _/692\ _/7-6\ /_O/9\ _/ 
\ _/1-3\ _/2f7\ _ 4\_/595\ _/699\ _/893\ _/-97\ 
7 /F7\ /21_\ _5 /49\ /63\ /77\ /91\ / 
FIG. 1. Initial map for the simulation runs. 
2. Using parameters, randomly assign an initial amount of power and an 
ability to estimate power to each state. 
(Segments II through IV may repeat for each iteration.) 
II. Opponent selection segment. 
A. Randomly select initiator. Chance of a state being selected is equal to its 
proportion of the total power in the system. 
B. Search for a target. Initiator examines all states on its borders, calculates its 
power advantage over each, and selects the state over which it has the 
greatest advantage. If it calculates that no surrounding state is weaker, 
simulation moves to segment IV. 
C. Calculate power disparity between target and initiator. 
1. If the target is weaker, it seeks allies. All of its allies must border on the 
initiator state. The combined power of the proposed coalition must 
provide the smallest possible margin of superiority over the initiator (i.e., 
it must be a minimal winning coalition). 
2. The target sends requests to all states selected as allies. Each potential ally 
calculates whether the proposed coalition will be larger than the oppo- 
nent. If so, then it joins the coalition; if not, it does not join. 
D. Calculate power balance between initiator and opponent (including any 
allies of opponent). 
1. If initiator is weaker, then it seeks allies using the same procedure as the 
target (allies must be adjacent to target; proposed coalition must be 
minimal winning). 
2. If the proposed coalition is more powerful than the opponent's, the 
potential partners join. 
3. If the proposed coalition is less powerful than the opponent's, it backs 
down, and the simulation proceeds to segment IV. 
E. Calculate the current power balance between the two sides. If the target is 
weaker, it goes through another round of alliance-seeking and sends bids. 
Potential allies make the same type of calculation, and join or refuse to join 
the coalition. 
This content downloaded from 128.42.230.100 on Thu, 2 May 2013 15:01:48 PM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
394 System and State in International Politics 
F. Calculate the final power balance between the two sides. If the initiator is 
weaker, it backs down. Otherwise war occurs. 
III. War outcome and costs segment. 
A. Determine war outcome by multiplying the actual initiating side's power by a 
random component. If this figure is larger than the target side's power, the 
initiator wins; otherwise the target wins. 
B. Assess all participants a war cost, based on the power ratio between the two 
sides (the closer the ratio to 1.0, the more costly the war), but subject to a 
prespecified limit. 
C. Assess all states on the losing side an additional war cost of 10 percent of 
their power. This goes into a "pot" to be divided among the members of the 
winning side. 
D. Use the power ratio between the winning and losing sides to calculate the 
number of cells of territory to be lost by the leader of the losing coalition. At 
least one cell is always lost. 
E. Distribute to each member of the winning side a share of the loser's "pot" of 
power equal to the state's proportion of the winning side's total power. 
F. Distribute cells given up by the loser to members of the winning side in 
order of power (i.e., the most powerful state on the winning side gets the 
first cell, the second most powerful state gets the second cell, etc.) 
IV. Power adjustment segment. 
A. Eliminate all states with no remaining power or cells of territory. 
B. End the run if only one state is left or the iteration limit is reached. 
Otherwise, grant all remaining states internal power growth of 3 percent. 
The simulation moves to segment LI. 
Let me make a few additional points about the simulation. First, in every 
calculation made by a state (e.g., which side is weaker, whether to join a coalition), its 
power estimation ability is part of the calculation. Given the size of this value, the 
calculation may produce an incorrect conclusion. Second, when selecting the cells 
that the leader of the losing side must give up, a cell must be adjacent to the state 
gaining the cell, but every attempt is made (a) to select a cell that is on the periphery 
of the losing state, and (b) not to split up the losing state into several discontinuous 
areas. 
Finally, note that the artificial world created in the simulation is a very primitive 
one. States make simple, shortsighted evaluations before acting. The world itself has 
only the minimal elements of the realist environment. But this arrangement has 
advantages. First, as a general research practice, it is easier to add complications to a 
simple model than it is to subtract them from a complicated model. Future studies 
can include a more realistic world and allow for straightforward comparisons with 
the version presented here. A second advantage concerns the central focus of this 
paper: balancing behavior in a system of self-interested states. Finding traces of 
balancing in such a primitive, anarchic world provides a strong basis for concluding 
that this behavior is likely to exist in a more complicated world, in which states can be 
plausibly assumed to have an interest in system equilibrium, and the system itself 
provides some constraints on unbridled self-interest.2 
2 The original designers of the simulation had to make some judgments about what elements of realpolitik to 
include, what to exclude, and what level of abstraction to use. For example, the simulation treats the world as 
having states in the center and states on the periphery, rather than as a globe in which every state has six neighbors 
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TABLE 1. Parameter specifications for the simulation runs. 
Parameter Value(s) 
Maximum number of iterations 500 
Mean for power distribution 10.00 
Standard deviation for power dist. 3.33, 6.67, 1.67 
Mean for power estimation 1.00 
Standard deviation for power est. 0.20, 0.40, 0.10 
Standard deviation for war outcome 0.20, 0.40, 0.10 
Growth rate 0.03 
The Parameters 
As discussed above, when random elements are introduced in a simulation, it is 
necessary to conduct a number of runs to determine its average behavior. In this 
paper, a set of values was used for three user-input parameters (see the discussion of 
segment I above), and each combination of parameter values was run with a number 
of different seeds for the random number generator. Table 1 displays the parameter 
values used for the simulation runs reported in this paper. 
The parameter for the standard deviation of the initial power distribution was 
varied to take into account the impact of even and uneven power distributions on the 
behavior of the system (the smaller the standard deviation, the more even the 
distribution of power across the original ninety-eight states). This was an important 
parameter to vary because of the references in the literature to an even distribution 
of power serving as an aid in maintaining the system in equilibrium. 
The parameter for the distribution of power estimation ability was varied to 
control for the impact of accurate intelligence on system behavior. A number of 
accounts of the balance of power stress that vigilance and an ability to gauge power 
accurately can aid the operation of the system (Gulick, 1955). On the other hand, the 
original work of Bremer and Milhalka (1977) showed that higher levels of inaccuracy 
(i.e., larger standard deviations) resulted in a lower level of state activity (less 
alliance-seeking, less alliance-joining, fewer wars) and longer runs before a single 
state acquired all the territory. This apparent contradiction in the effects of accuracy 
makes varying this parameter especially important. 
Finally, the standard deviation for war outcome was varied to control for the 
impact of unforeseen factors ("fate," "luck") on the outcome of a war. The larger the 
standard deviation, the greater the role of chance in determining the winner and 
loser of a war. Much as with the power estimation parameter, the traditional 
literature would lead one to expect that the larger the role of chance, the greater the 
difficulty in maintaining the system. With a large standard deviation, "good 
decisions" (decisions made by states with a good ability to estimate power) are as 
likely to be punished as bad decisions. 
As displayed in table 1, three different values were used for each parameter. An 
initial "normal" value was selected, as well as a value one-half the normal value, and a 
(i.e., the map "wraps around"). Some may view this as a distortion, but inclusion of this feature allows the 
assessment of the impact of an abstract geographical feature on state survival (Stoll, 1986) or on the evolution of the 
system. 
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value double the initial value. Each of the resulting twenty-seven parameter 
combinations was run with ten different start values for the random number 
generator in the program. The start values were taken from a table of random 
numbers.3 
Research Design 
Data from the 270 simulation runs will be used to answer the two questions posed 
earlier: (a) Does balancing behavior emerge in a primitive, anarchic system? and (b) is 
this enough to preserve the existence of most states? Since the second question is 
more easily answered, the discussion of the research design for it will be brief. 
Several different analyses will be conducted to answer the first question. 
System Preservation 
All runs of the simulation had an iteration limit of 500. Support for the ability of a 
system of self-interested states to preserve itself is inferred if the system deadlocks 
before iteration 500. A deadlock occurs if the size of the system remains unaltered 
for an extended period of time; more specifically, a deadlock occurs when the 
attrition in system membership ceases at some point before the iteration limit. 
Previous work with a number of variants of this simulation (Bremer and Mihalka, 
1977; Cusack and Zimmer, 1986; Stoll, 1986) would indicate that this type of 
stabilization is a rare occurrence. Any runs that stabilize slightly before the iteration 
limit are rerun with a larger limit to insure that the apparent stability is not simply a 
result of the iteration limit, but persists for an extended period of time. 
Balancing: Concept, Measurement, and Analysis 
The key behavior of interest in this theoretical experiment is balancing. In the 
simulation, an iteration begins with the selection of an initiator. This initiator then 
examines its borders for a target-a state that the initiator calculates it can defeat in a 
war. Given this situation, balancing behavior is defined as follows: balancing behavior 
occurs when the power ratio of target to initiator changes to become more favorable 
to the target, and therefore to decrease the chances of the target losing the war. 
Balancing behavior is not programmed into the simulation. To make this point 
clear, consider the three types of states involved in a conflict: the initiator, the target, 
and states sought as allies. 
The initiator confronts a variety of choices in the course of an iteration: the 
selection of a target, whether to seek allies, and (at several points) whether to back 
down or to escalate. At each of these points, the initiator seeks to ensure that it has a 
power advantage over the target. If it does not have a power advantage, and if it 
3As a precaution, two series of additional runs were done with more extreme values for each of the three 
parameters. Since the purpose of these runs was to investigate the properties of the model under more extreme 
conditions, a new set of only upper and lower values was used, and just three runs were made for each set; the 
result was twenty-four uns for each of the two new series. For the first series, low values of all three parameters 
were set to 0.05, the high value for the power distribution was 10, and the remaining parameters had high values of 
1.0. For the second series, low values of all three parameters were set to 0.01, the high value for the power 
distribution was set to 20, and the high values for the remaining parameters were set to 2.0. For important 
differences between the results for these runs and those discussed in the text, see n. 5. 
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cannot create such an advantage, it backs down. The initiator always acts either to 
create a power advantage for itself or to retreat from a situation in which it is at a 
disadvantage. 
The other two types of state can be considered more briefly. The target has two 
opportunities to seek allies; in both cases, it attempts to construct a coalition whose 
power is greater than that of the opponent. States sought as allies estimate whether 
the proposed coalition will be more powerful than the other side. If the potential ally 
calculates that it will be on the larger side, it joins the coalition; otherwise it will not. 
Each individual state in the system acts in terms of a narrowly defined (and 
primitively calculated) self-interest. At the heart of this self-interest is the calculation 
of a power ratio. States always strive to put themselves in a position whereby they are 
a member of the more powerful side. But despite the lack of individual state 
behavior motivated by the goal of balancing, the net results at the dyadic level (i.e., at 
the level of the conflict) may still be balancing behavior. Determining whether this is 
true in the simulation is the focus of this paper. 
Balancing behavior can be traced through the observation of two aspects of the 
behavior of the simulation. First, if the target puts together a coalition whose power 
is calculated by the initiator as being larger than its own, the initiator backs down. 
Thus, if an initiator and a target are selected, but no war occurs, this is evidence of 
balancing. Second, if the conflict does escalate to war, balancing behavior is observed 
if the final ratio of target-to-initiator power (the ratio that includes all actual 
participants in the war) is more favorable to the target than the power ratio between 
just the target state and the initiator state. 
To distinguish between the two aspects of balancing, note their correspondence to 
the traditional distinction between deterrence and defense. Deterrence involves 
convincing a potential adversary that the potential costs of undertaking an action 
outweigh the benefits. In the context of the simulation, an initiator is deterred if it 
calculates that it is unlikely to win the war. Defense involves defeating an adversary in 
actual combat. In the simulation, the more favorable the power ratio to the target, 
the more likely the defeat of the initiator. The first form of balancing (stopping the 
escalation to war) will be called deterrent balancing, and the second (the occurrence 
of a war, but with a change in the power ratio favorable to the target) will be called 
defensive balancing. 
Both forms of balancing behavior can be determined in a straightforward manner. 
The degree of deterrent balancing can be measured by comparing the proportion of 
conflicts that end in war to 1.0 (the proportion of conflicts we expect to end in war if 
no balancing occurs). The degree of defensive balancing can be measured by 
examining all iterations that proceed to war and comparing the initial ratio of target 
to initiator to the final power ratio (i.e., the ratio incuding all participating allies). If 
defensive balancing occurs on a regular basis, the final ratio should be consistently 
more favorable to the target than the initial ratio.4 
The two comparisons described above provide global assessments of the amount of 
balancing behavior that emerges from the artificial world of the simulation. But 
4 Two additional points should be made about the analysis. First, given the very large number of iterations, we 
should expect any statistical test to obtain results that are unlikely by chance, even if the results have no substantive 
import. The second point is that in a "real" balance-of-power system, a variety of means are available to states to 
increase their available power, and therefore to engage in balancing (see Gulick, 1955, for an especially lucid 
exposition). However, in this simulation, all attempts to balance boil down to the power ratio between initiator and 
target. 
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there are two sets of possible influences that should be examined to determine if any 
pattern of balancing is unusual, or confounded by a subset of the runs. First, the 
behavior may shift with changes in parameter values. Balancing may occur under 
some sets of parameters, but not under others. Second, behavior may shift during 
the course of a run. Balancing may be present to a different degree in the earlier 
iterations of a run than in the endgame that occurs when only a few states remain. 
Several analyses will be presented to control for these effects. 
Results and Discussion 
The answer to whether this system of self-interested states can maintain itself is clear: 
only six of the 270 runs deadlock. The remaining 264 runs end between iteration 
177 and iteration 423; the mean is 252.9 iterations, with a standard deviation of 42.6. 
Clearly, given this particular world, the ultimate outcome of the interaction of 
self-interested states is an empire.5 
Testing for Deterrent Balancing 
The t-tests used to evaluate the amount of deterrent balancing in the simulation are 
displayed in table 2. The table shows conflict iterations (each iteration in which an 
initiator and a target is selected) aggregated across all runs, and then grouped by 
iteration. In each line, the distribution of war and no-war outcomes is displayed, 
along with the probability of a conflict ending in war. 
If no balancing occurs, we expect that all conflicts hould escalate to war. The 
t-values in the table are calculated assuming 1.0 for the expected proportion of 
escalations and comparing this to the observed proportion of escalations. The size of 
the t-values for each grouping of iterations (ignoring the small number of cases at 
iterations 400 and beyond), indicates that a significant number of conflicts do not 
escalate because the initiator at some point calculates that the power ratio is not 
advantageous. The chances of a conflict escalating to war drop throughout the 
iterations, from almost 90 percent (a probability of .82) in the first fifty iterations, 
through 49 percent for iterations 251-300 (remember that the average number of 
iterations in a run is just over 250), to 0 for iterations 451-500. 
In sum, there is evidence of deterrent balancing in the simulation. Although war 
represents the best means for a state to gain power, the proportion of iterations 
ending in war drops steadily throughout a run. There is even a noticeable deterrent 
effect in the earliest iterations. All of this behavior occurs even though all states 
simply calculate whether involvement in a conflict will place them on the more 
powerful side. 
5 Dummy variables were coded for each parameter's high and low values (i.e., for each parameter, one variable 
was coded 1 when it took on its high value, and 0 otherwise, and a second variable was coded 1 when it took on its 
low value, and 0 otherwise). Regressing the total number of iterations in a run on this series of dummies produced 
an r-square of only 0.15, indicating that the parameter values had little impact on the length of a run. The average 
number of iterations in the two extreme value series of runs (see n. 3) was 295.7, and 10 of these 48 runs (21 
percent) deadlocked. Regressing the length of a run on dummy variables for the parameter values revealed that the 
war outcome parameter had the largest impact on the length of a run. The effect of an extremely large random 
component is to reduce, perhaps even destroy, the relationship between power advantage and victory. If winning a 
war is random with respect to power, it will be much more difficult for states to continually accumulate power by 
fighting weaker opponents, since they will lose some of these wars. The consequence of this is to lengthen the 
period of time until a single state controls the map. 
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TABLE 2. Testing deterrent balancing: t-values for 
proportion of conflicts escalating to war (expected 
proportion of escalations: 1.0) 
Outcome of 
confiict 
Probability 
Iterations t-Value No war War of war 
All -140.4 14516 40488 .74 
1-50 -49.6 2021 9223 .82 
51-100 -53.9 2321 9190 .80 
101-150 -57.8 2578 8730 .77 
151-200 -61.7 2802 7772 .74 
201-250 -61.7 2454 4444 .64 
251-300 -49.9 1118 909 .49 
301-350 -49.6 560 165 .23 
351-400 -47.2 283 41 .13 
401-450 -52.5 190 14 .07 
451-500 - 189 0 .00 
Testing for Defensive Balancing 
As discussed earlier, even if an initiator escalates a conflict to war, the balancing 
tendencies of the system may result in a diminished power advantage for the 
initiator, and consequently a greater chance for the target to survive. This type of 
balancing is measured by comparing the power ratio of the target state to the 
initiator state, with the final target-side to initiator-side ratio (which involves all of the 
allies that have joined either side). The results of a series of t-tests, one on the entire 
set of conflicts ending in war, and then a series of tests for groups of iterations, are 
shown in table 3. 
Examining first the t-test for all observations (at the top of table 3), we can see that 
there is a large difference between the first and final power ratios (note: the reader 
TABLE 3. Testing defensive balancing: t-values for 
change in target-to-initiator power ratio 
Iterations t-Value Start ratio End ratio N 
All 139.5 .51 .81 40489 
1-50 78.1 .58 .94 9575 
51-100 76.6 .52 .89 9199 
101-150 68.0 .47 .81 8708 
151-200 53.1 .45 .74 7699 
201-250 29.9 .50 .67 4253 
251-300 8.9 .60 .69 841 
301-350 0.4 .62 .69 161 
351-400 1.0 .59 .72 40 
401-450 0.0 .71 .71 13 
451-500 - .59 0 
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should bear in mind that this t-test had 40,489 observations, so any difference in 
ratios will be statistically significant). The initial ratio (.51) gives the initiator almost a 
2: 1 advantage, but this is decreased to 1.2: 1 if a war is fought. 
Turning to the separate tests for each group of iterations, we see that the defensive 
balancing effect declines through time. This is seen most readily in the fall of the 
t-value from 78.12 for observations in iterations 1-50, to very small values for 
iteration 300 and beyond (remembering that very few runs go beyond the 300th 
iteration). Note that the start ratio-the ratio between the target state and the 
initiator state-remains close to .5 for the first 250 iterations. What changes is the 
end ratio, the ratio including all allies, which declines through time. 
Parameter Value Effects 
Since the effect of time on balancing behavior has been examined in tables 2 and 3, it 
is only necessary to explore the impact of parameter values. The effects are displayed 
in table 4. For each extreme parameter value (i.e., the high value and the low value, 
but not the normal value), a dichotomous variable was created, classifying iterations 
as either having the value, or not. The result of this procedure was to place about 
one-third of the observations in the "have" category, and the remainder in the "have 
not" for each parameter. 
The top of table 4 displays, for each dichotomous variable, the proportion of 
iterations ending in war and no war. A t-value for the difference in proportion is also 
displayed. Bearing in mind the earlier caution about inferring too much from the 
t-values, considering the large number of observations that go into each calculation, 
there is little difference in the amount of deterrent balancing by parameter value. 
The largest difference occurs for the power estimation standard deviation, indicat- 
ing that the larger the standard deviation (and hence the greater variability in 
estimation ability across states), the more the amount of deterrent balancing. As with 
the initial simulation study of Bremer and Mihalka (1977), a world of varying 
estimation ability produces "cautious" behavior by initiators. 
The bottom of table 4 displays the difference in first-to-final t rget-to-initiator 
power ratio by parameter value. In other words, in the runs with the high value for 
the standard deviation of power estimation, the power ratio of target to initiator 
shifted an average of .34 from the first to the final (i.e., including all allies) ratio, 
while the power ratio for all runs without he high value on this parameter shifted an 
average of .30. As with deterrent balancing, the power estimation parameter is the 
only one that has any impact on balancing behavior. 
Summary of Results 
The results of the analysis are clear. In this anarchic, self-help system, even though 
there is no incentive or imperative for states to behave to restrain the aggressive 
actions of others, there is a tendency for balancing behavior to emerge. If this is the 
good news, the bad news is that although balancing behavior occurs in the very 
primitive world of this simulation, this is an insufficient guarantee for system 
preservation. In all but a handful of runs, one state emerges as the sole survivor of 
the ninety-eight-state system. 
This content downloaded from 128.42.230.100 on Thu, 2 May 2013 15:01:48 PM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
RICHARD J. STOLL 401 
TABLE 4. Testing for parameter value effects: t-values for 
deterrent and defensive balancing 
Value 
present? 
Parameter No Yes t-Value 
Deterrent balancing: 
proportion of conflicts 
escalating to war 
High std. dev. .73 .74 2.87 
power dist. 
Low std. dev. .74 .73 1.35 
power dist. 
High std. dev. .71 .79 18.82 
power est. dist. 
Low std. dev. .77 .68 21.00 
power est. dist. 
High std. dev. .73 .74 3.40 
war outcome 
Low std. dev. .74 .72 4.38 
war outcome 
Defensive balancing: 
change in target-to- 
initiator power ratio 
High std. dev. .30 .34 8.29 
power dist. 
Low std. dev. .33 .29 8.26 
power dist. 
High std. dev. .36 .28 30.56 
power est. dist. 
Low std. dev. .25 .42 36.27 
power est. dist. 
High std. dev. .32 .31 2.08 
war outcome 
Low std. dev. .31 .31 0.19 
war outcome 
Summary 
The relationship of state behavior to system behavior has occupied the thoughts and 
words of many international scholars. Most authors have asserted that while 
self-interest is the dominant (even proper) motivation of states, this is not sufficient 
to keep the system in equilibrium. However, there is considerable disagreement as to 
what is necessary to prevent the system from disintegrating. 
In this paper, I introduced a tool to perform "theoretical experiments" on 
anarchic systems: a computer simulation. I used the simulation to investigate 
whether balancing behavior would emerge in a very primitive nvironment consist- 
ing of shortsighted but expansionist states. Perhaps surprisingly, it does emerge, 
however this is not enough to keep one state from dominating the system. 
Given the very primitive world of the simulation, it may be better to focus on the 
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existence of balancing behavior, rather than the final outcome. This behavior leads 
one to speculate that in a less primitive environment containing states with more 
foresight, and perhaps some constraints on state behavior, self-interested balancing 
might well preserve the system. 
Examination of this speculation must be deferred for future research. For now, we 
must conclude only that balancing can emerge in even the most primitive environ- 
ments, and that a computer simulation is an attractive way to explore the theoretical 
possibilities in the power politics and balance-of-power literatures. 
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